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I. DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES HAVE PROPERLY IDENTIFIED PARTIES AT
TRIAL LEVEL
Defendants-Appellees have identified the Salt Lake City Redevelopment Agency,
Roger Thompson, Alice Steiner and McDonald Brothers as parties at the trial level. They
are not parties on appeal because the Mission and Pastor Wilson did not appeal regarding
their dismissal.
II.
EQUITABLE CHALLENGE TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE "AS
APPLIED" TREATMENT OF THE MISSION AND PASTOR WILSON CAN BE
HEARD UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
The Defendants-Appellees argument that the Mission has failed to follow the
City's appeal process overlooks the fact that the Mission and Pastor Wilson, the
Plaintiffs-Appellants, continue to challenge the inadequacy of the process on an "as
applied" basis.
A.

Challenge Under the Wintergreen-UDOT Standard
On September 18, 2007, the Utah Supreme Court confirmed that "ripeness" was

satisfied by raising a constitutional challenge to the as applied procedure and remedies
afforded a litigant by a state statutory scheme.
[*P9] ... Wintergreen should be permitted to develop its case to show, if it can, the
independent viability of its constitutional claims.
[*P10] .... Accordingly, if the constitutional claims of a landowner suggest that the
relevant direct condemnation procedure is "unavailable or inadequate" or that the
remedies it offers are incomplete, the claims may sidestep ripeness challenges. ...
[*P14] ... A constitutional cause of action rooted in the organic law of our state is
presumptively superior to and must displace any statutory iteration that either
8

conflicts with it or gives it less than full effect. Owing to its different lineage, a
constitutional cause of action can never be preempted by statute, regardless of how
fully the statute honors the contours of the constitutional claim *
The documented unavailability and inadequacy of procedures, (and lack of remedies,)
available to the Mission and Pastor Wilson vis-a-vis the City and individual defendants
justify this Court hearing their claims for declaratory relief under the Utah Constitution.
1.

Procedures Unavailable to the Mission and Pastor Wilson
As a procedural matter, in 1999 and 2007 "owners of real property" are able to

seek judicial prohibition of
violations of this chapter or ordinances enacted under the authority of this
chapter occur or are about to occur may, in addition to other remedies
provided by law, institute: (i) injunctions, mandamus, abatement, or any
other appropriate actions; or (ii) proceedings to prevent, enjoin, abate, or
remove the unlawful building, use, or act.2
This procedure does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies. However, the
Mission and Pastor Wilson were not and are not "owners of real property." Thus while
directly affected, they are deprived of a statutory right to seek to restrain the City and
individual defendants from their past and on-going arbitrary, capricious and illegal
4

conduct in violation of mandatory ordinances and constitutional provisions.
In 2005, the Utah State Legislature adopted the "Utah Religious Land Use Act." It

allows the implementation of a land use regulation that imposes a substantial burden on a

1

Wintergreen Group, LC v. Utah DOT, 2007 UT 75, P9-10, 14 (Utah 2007)
Compare U.C.A. § 10-9-1002 (1999) with U.C.A. § 10-9a-802 (2007) adding
"adversely affected" to modify "owner of real estate."
3
Cf. Culbertson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2001 UT 108, P30-P31, 44 P.3d 642.
2

9

person's free exercise of religion only when the government can establish that the
imposition "is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest" and "is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest."5 Applying only
to causes of action filed after May 2, 2005,6 it does not apply to this case.
2. Procedures Allegedly Available to the Mission Were and Are Inadequate
As applied, four procedures superficially available to Pastor Wilson and the
Mission were and are inadequate.
a.

Offer to Accept a Conditional Use Application for the Cohen Property
The Mission's March - June 1999 efforts to proceed as a permitted use as a "place

of worship" for the Cohen property were ostensively ameliorated by the April 20, 1999
letter's offer to accept a conditional use application as, inter alia, a homeless shelter. A
review of the letter (and the failure of homeless shelters to be included in the terms of the
"moratorium,") belies the adequacy of such an offer.
Brent Wilde and Bill Wright, of the PZD, and Lynn Pace, of the City
Attorney's office, reviewed the administrative interpretation letter of April
20, 1999, before it was sent to the Mission. (Deposition of Randy Taylor,
45:8-11, Appendix Exhibit 5.)
The April 20, 1999, letter contained a classification of the Mission as
a homeless shelter, based on "the descriptions given to me in writing and
the discussions that I held — that I had." (Deposition of Randy Taylor,
36:20-23, Appendix Exhibit 5.)
Randy Taylor did consider whether or not the sheltering of the
homeless overnight in an emergency situation could be "an accessory use"
of the Mission's place of worship. His decision was based on the
"magnitude of activity that seemed to be going on" without distinguishing
between day and night activities. "I mean I don't know that much about

5
6

U.C.A. § 63-90b-201(2) (a) & (b).
Laws 2005, ch. 99, § 11.
10

what they were doing other than it was characterized as quite a bit of
activity." (Deposition of Randy Taylor 34:5-19, Appendix Exhibit 5.) He
relied on "the descriptions given me in writing and the discussions that he
held, that he had." (Deposition of Randy Taylor 36:20-23. Appendix
Exhibit 5.) [Nonetheless,] [w]hile he met with Philip Arena and his
superiors Brent Wilde or Bill Wright, (Deposition of Philip Arena, 15:1616:4, Appendix Exhibit 6.), he did not recall ever discussing with them how
one would determine whether or not "providing shelter to the homeless on
an emergency basis could be an accessory use of the church." (Deposition
of Randy Taylor, 35:13-17, Appendix Exhibit 5.)
Had the April 20, 1999, administrative interpretation not classified
the Mission as a homeless shelter 7 ... the Mission would have been able to
obtain a building permit for the Cohen building. (Deposition of Randy
Taylor 33:12-34:5, Appendix Exhibit 5; Affidavit of Wayne Wilsonffi[2634.)
The April 20, 1999, classification of the Mission as a homeless
shelter, rather than as a permitted use only, required that a hearing be held
before the community council as to its proposed use. (Deposition of
Randy Taylor, 36:9-13, Appendix Exhibit 5.)
In the April 20, 1999, administrative interpretation letter, city policy
favoring the decentralization of services for the homeless was used as a
basis to notify the Mission that PDZ staff would not be able to make a
positive recommendation were the Mission to submit an application for a
conditional use permit regarding the Cohen property. (Deposition Exhibit 2;
Appendix Exhibit 15.)
Because the Planning Commission ... [follows the staff
recommendations] eighty-five to ninety percent (85% - 90%) of the time,
(Deposition of Randy Taylor 44:3-10, Appendix Exhibit 5) the "unwritten"
but implemented City policy, announced in advance, of decentralization of
services to the homeless would guarantee a negative recommendation by
the staff regarding the proposed conditional use and would also result in a
rejection of the proposal by the Planning Commission. See Omitted Facts
##104, 147, infra.
The [letter] also indicated it "would be willing to assist you in the
location of a more suitable site that is consistent with the city's preference
for smaller facilities in decentralized locations throughout the county." ...
Other than to "broaden the base, the geography," Randy Taylor did not
know why the offer was made "throughout the county" rather than

7

The Opposition Brief only addresses the classification of the Mission as
homeless shelter. (Opposition Brief at 11).
n

"throughout the city." (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 44:11-45:11,
Appendix Exhibit 5.)
The Mission was advised [in the letter] to refer to the City Attorneys
to resolve unstated legal questions.
The Mission's limited budget and other time constraints would not
allow investment in an effort to secure a building permit for a building for
which the City had volunteered such an openly hostile assessment.
(Affidavit of Wayne Wilsonffl[26, 28, 34, Appendix Exhibit 12.)8
It was futile to "pursue such applications when a [City] ... has dug in its heels and made
clear that all such applications will be [recommended by the City PZD to be] denied" 9
and offered to provide assistance to relocate out of the City!
b. Appeal to Land Use Appeals Board
In October 1999, the Mission had the option to appeal its denial to the Land Use
Appeals Board. The Board was only allowed to re-evaluate the Planning Commission
based on the existing record (unless evidence was improperly excluded,) and if there is
(a) prejudicial procedural error or (b) the decision was not supported by the findings of
fact. (SLCCO § 2.88.080 D) Under the Defendants-Appellants' authority of Murphy v.
New Milford Zoning Comm'n such an appeal would not be necessary to satisfy any
requirement of finality.
[A] property owner will not be required to litigate a dispute before a zoning
board of appeals if it sits purely as a remedial body. See Williamson
County, 473 U.S. at 193 (holding that appeal to zoning board of appeals is
not required when the board is "empowered, at most, to review [a]

^Record at 3233, Omitted Fact P 89: 3246, Omitted Fact P 99: 3245-56, Omitted
Fact P 96: 3246, Omitted Fact PlOO: 3247, Omitted Fact P103: 3204, Disputed Fact P23:
3204, Disputed Fact P 23: 3247, Omitted Fact P102:3259, Omitted Fact #102.
9
Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Comm'n, 402 F.3d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 2005).
12

rejection, not to participate in the . . . decision making"). ... [or] lacks
discretion to grant [permits or] variances 10
In all events, in light of the expiration of the lease option on the subject property, any
appeal as it would be "pointless."11 If the administrative appeal was "moot" from the
outset, the Mission could never had established the "ripeness" necessary for standing.
c. Offer to Allow the Mission to Adhere to Inter-Faith Standards Lacks Clarity on
Material Issues
The Defendants-Appellees stated below and on appeal that that it "willing to allow
the Mission and any other church to operate according to these same Interfaith
Hospitality guidelines." (Opposition Brief at 16.) However, despite the Mission's request
in September of 2003, the City has not clarified whether or not its "Interfaith" acceptable
policy requires adherence to other aspects of the Interfaith version of "religious worship"
that address issues beyond numbers of people assisted and duration of stay.
The Interfaith guidelines operate not only in terms of numbers of
homeless sheltered, and the duration of the stay, but also as to who is
served. Interfaith only serves single or two-parent families with
children. The Mission serves families and individuals. Interfaith will
not serve those with addictions; the Mission will. Interfaith implicitly is
understood to work only with residents of the City and Salt Lake Valley.
(Deposition Exhibit 32...) The Mission serves local residents and those
who are transient; taking the biblical injunction "least of these, my
brethren" quite literally. The Mission will not turn away a homeless
person in a life-threatening position (twenty degrees (20°) or below
outside) when there are no other available options in the City; Interfaith
has no provision for such assistance.

Id. (citation omitted.)
Id
13

(Record at 3217.) With such vagueness, the Mission and Pastor Wilson cannot know
in advance if any standard of the City is doctrinally feasible and viable.
d.

Appellate Rights to Board of Adjustments from Administrative
Decisions and "Use" Interpretations

The "use" interpretation letters12 both contained notice of a right to appeal to the
Board of Adjustments. However, despite involvement of the City Attorney's office, the
letters themselves were issued contrary to mandatory provisions of City ordinances that
afforded the applicant the ability to frame the factual representations and the legal
question to be determined. (Opening Brief at 28; see SLCCO § 21A 12.040, Tab 5,
Defendants-Appellants Addendum.) Without the underlying protections required by the
City Code as to the subject matter being appealed, the letters that are the subject of the
appeal are from the outset void ab initio.

12

See April 20, 1999 letter regarding to Cohen Property at 580 West 300 South,
(Opposition Brief at 11,) and the September 14, 1999 letter regarding the first application
regarding the Rosewood Terrace Building at 168 North 600 West, (Opposition Brief at
12,)
13
As to the September 14, 1999 letter, the filing of an appeal to the Board of
Adjustment three days before the Planning Commission Hearing required that the Board
of Adjustment appeal be heard first unless the Zoning Administrator made an express
finding that to not do so was "in the best interest of the City." (SLCCO § 21A. 16.030 C,
Tab 8, Defendants-Appellees' Addendum.) Assuming arguendo one was made, having
chosen to allow the Planning Commission Decision to proceed forward, deny the
conditional use permit application for which it was written, the City was estopped from
returning to hear an appeal of a "use interpretation" that is no longer "ripe" for review.
To give itself self-serving "two bites of the apple" to block the efforts of the Mission to
obtain a conditional use permit, (when as to this letter the Mission had none,) can only be
understood to be an expression of hostility.
14

On the other hand, the June 7, 2004 letter had no notice of any appeal rights. ZA
Mills who issued the letter confirmed he did not believe it was an administrative decision.
(Record at 3374.) As it was based on an original ruling that was void ab initio, the
informal letter afforded no realistic opportunity for an appeal.
3. Remedies Available to the Mission Are Incomplete
As noted in the Opening brief, failure to provide mandatory portions of the
application for conditional use permits precluded the Mission from even applying for relocation during 1997-1998. In April and June of 1999, use of an administrative "use"
interpretation letter issued without following mandatory protections for an applicant was
used by the City to deny the Mission an application for a building permit where it was a
permitted use. Any appeal of the April 20, 1999 letter would have stopped all processes
regarding the requests (SLCCO § 21A.16.030 C, Tab 8, Defendants-Appellees'
Addendum,) thereby further delaying the issuance of a building permit for a permitted
use. While the City may technically claim it did not evict the Mission (Opposition Brief
at 7,) had it afforded the Mission and Pastor Wilson what they were entitled to under the
SLCCO, there would have been no 1999 eviction from the Gateway location.
Based on the foregoing, under the Wintergreen-UDOT standard, both Pastor
Wilson and the Mission have satisfied the requirement of "ripeness" as it relates to their
equitable claims under the Utah Constitution.

14

This is the second request regarding the Rosewood Terrace Building (Record at
683, Opening Brief Addendum)
15

B. Criminal Prosecution Affords Separate Basis For Equitable Relief
Under the State Constitution for Pastor Wilson and the Mission
As noted earlier, Pastor Wilson was criminally prosecuted for violating the City
zoning laws. Since leaving the Central Christian Church in June of 2002, he has been
told by the PZD Planning Director, in the presence of City counsel, that if he allows one
person to sleep overnight, the Mission will be considered to be a homeless shelter. As
Pastor Wilson is on the Mission's Board of Trustees and is its Chief Executive Officer, if
the Mission allows him to recklessly violate the law, the Mission, too, can be subject to
criminal prosecution.15
Because of the foregoing, Pastor Wilson and the Mission have chosen to follow
the rule of law by choosing the alternative of self-censorship instead of risking further
criminal prosecution. Seeking relief without resorting to civil disobedience and risking
criminal prosecution does not eliminate the standing of Plaintiffs/Appellants or ripeness
of the equitable claims brought by such a person or entity.

As Pastor Wilson's

prosecution has already occurred, and was dismissed without prejudice, both he and the
Mission have held a reasonable fear that without a declaration of rights and restraining
unconstitutional actions, any future conduct in conformance with their religious beliefs

15

See U.C.A. § 76-2-204(2) ("A corporation or association is guilty of an offense
when: ... (2) The conduct constituting the offense is authorized, solicited, requested,
commanded, or undertaken, performed, or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors
or by a high managerial agent acting within the scope of his employment and in behalf of
the corporation or association.")
16

means "prosecution is [not] improbable;" the self- censorship and realistic fear confers
standing, rising "to the level of a palpable injury."16
C. Defendants-Appellees Reliance on Messiah Baptist Church17 As A Basis to
Interpret Free Exercise Provisions of the Utah Constitution Fails on the Merits
Messiah Baptist Church was proffered to show that the Mission and Pastor
Wilson were not entitled to any further accommodation than that provided in that
opinion. This argument overlooks the more expansive text protecting the free exercise of
religion under the Utah Constitution.
1.

Messiah Baptist Church Is Factually Distinguishable in this Case
It is argued on appeal that a church has no right to be free from "reasonable zoning

regulations" (Opposition Brief at 30, 33). For reasons cited heretofore, the City does not
have "reasonable zoning regulations."
It is argued on appeal that "regulation of where an entity can build or locate a
place of worship does not impermissibly regulate religious conduct" (Id. at 30). The
Mission and Pastor Wilson assert that their location has a significant effect on their
ability to reach and serve those persons that their ministry is dedicated to.
It is argued on appeal that the City Ordinances do not regulate "religious belief of
the Mission or Pastor Wilson. (Id. at 30-31). To the contrary, while on the face the City

16

Berg v. State, 2004 UT App 337, P7-P10, 100 P.3d 261.
Messiah Baptist Church v. Jefferson County, 859 F.2d 820 (10th Cir. 1988) cert,
denied 490 U.S. 1005(1989).
17

17

ordinances do not regulate "religious belief," as applied, they are precluding their
exercise of the same.
It is urged on appeal that and so long as the Mission "has options to locate its
place of worship somewhere in the City as a matter of right, the City is not regulating
conduct." (Id. at 32.) As applied to the Mission in 1999, 2002, 2003, and 2004 thru the
present ,it does not have that right.
2. Precedent of a Sister State With Similar Text to Utah Constitution Provides A
Form of Analysis Affording Protection in Excess of Used in Messiah Baptist
Church
Defendants-Appellees cited the entire provisions of Article I §§ 1 and 4 as well as
that of III §1 of the Utah Constitution as dispositive law. Having done so, review of a
sister state with similar provisions is appropriate as analogous precedent demonstrating
how similar state constitutional provisions have been interpreted with an analysis that
affords more protection to the free exercise of religion than does the format or facts of the
Messiah Baptist Church opinion.
Of the other seven states cited in the Opening Brief with related free-exercise
constitutional provisions to those of Utah, (Opening Brief at 45 n. 39) Idaho is the only
one that has interpreted the same as a matter of state law before the United States
Supreme Court incorporated the First Amendment of Bill of Rights to restrain state
governments and their political subdivisions.
The constitution of Idaho guarantees to each inhabitant of the state the
inalienable right to decide for himself as to the wisdom and righteousness
of his mode of worship. It is provided in sec. 4, art. 1, that "The exercise
and enjoyment of religious faith and worship shall forever be guaranteed";
and in sec. 19, art. 21, as follows: "It is ordained by the state of Idaho that
18

perfect toleration of religious sentiment shall be secured, and no inhabitant
of said state shall ever be molested in person or property on account of his
or her mode of religious worship."
The good faith of respondent and his associates in adopting and carrying
out their plan of devotional exercises has not been questioned, and it is not
for this court to decide that it is, or that it is not, the correct course for them
to pursue. We feel that the provisions of the constitution above quoted
prohibit us from deciding that question, and that, in a case like this, where
entire good faith is apparent and where the exercises were not being
conducted merely in the name of religion and as a pretense and subterfuge
to cover acts criminal in their nature, we would not presume to decide it
if we were not so prohibited.
To place upon the statute under consideration the construction asked for by
appellant and to hold that the use of a moving picture machine on Sunday,
for the purpose to which it was put by respondent and his associates, is
keeping open or operating a moving picture show in violation of the statute,
would be to improperly invoke the police power of the state for, thus
construed and in that particular, the statute would bear no real or substantial
relation to the public health, the public morals, the public peace in conflict
with sec. 4, art. 1, and sec. 19, art. 21, of the constitution, for thereby
religious liberty would be denied.18
Instead of a balancing of "compelling governmental interest" and "least restrictive
means," the regulation of sincerely held, religiously motivated conduct and beliefs were
treated in more absolute terms. The same type of analysis could be done under the Utah
Constitution.
3.

Reliance on a Sole U.S. Supreme Court Justice Opinion To Justify No Greater
Protections than the United States Constitution Is Not Binding
and Violates State Enabling Act
Defendants-Appellees rely on the opinion of Justice Stevens concurring in the

1997 case of City of Boerne v. Flores for the proposition that "governmental preference

State v. Morris, 28 Idaho 599, 607-608, 155 P. 296, 298-299 (1916).
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for religion, as opposed to irreligion, is forbidden by the First Amendment."19 Relying
on part of the three-prong test of Lemon v. Kurtzman,20 Defendants-Appellants further
contend that "[a] state constitution with a free exercise of religion clause or perfect
tolerance clause, whose main purpose is to protect religion does not have a secular
purpose and has the primary effect of advancing religion." (Opposition Brief at 29 n. 14.)
This is wrong.
a.

Justice Stevens Does Not Override Effect of the City of Boerne Decision

Justice Steven's statements are not authoritative. They represented his opinion,
not the majority position of the Court. The Utah Supreme Court is bound by no other.
Furthermore, the case specifically held that Congress could impose the same
RFRA on federal agencies even though its blanket application on the states exceeded
Congressional authority. This recognition means that the First Amendment Establishment
Clause does not prohibit a government entity from regulating its own political
subdivisions.
In addition, just as the authority of Congress was upheld regarding RFRA as to
matters subject to federal regulation, in light of the origins and duration of the religious
controversy between the dominant faith and majority of the inhabitants of the Territory of
Utah and the federal government, even under the holding of City of Boerne v. Flores%

19

521 U.S. 507, 536-537 (1997) (Stevens, J.)

20

Lemon stated a three-part test: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an excessive government

20

there is no reason that in 1895, Congress could not have required in the State's Enabling
Act that the adopted constitution required, inter alia, that "perfect toleration of religious
sentiment shall be secured, and that no inhabitant of said State shall ever be molested in
person or property on account of his or her mode of religious worship." The imposition of
the same obligation by Utah State Constitution on a city in Utah furthers rather than
conflicts with federal constitutional prerogatives.
b.

Suggested Perspective Violates 1895 Enabling Act

Furthermore, to the degree that the constitutional understanding of 1895 is relevant
to interpreting the breadth of the Utah Constitution, an expansive interpretation of these
terms is in accord with the requirements the Enabling Act.21 In 1895, Congress directed
that the Utah Constitution
shall be republican in form, and make no distinction in civil or political
rights on account of race or color, except as to Indians not taxed, and not to
be repugnant to the Constitution of the United States and the principles of
the Declaration of Independence.
In 1892, the United States Supreme Court stated that
no purpose of action against religion can be imputed to any legislation,
state or national, because this is a religious people. This is historically true.
From the discovery of this continent to the present hour, there is a single
voice making this affirmation. ... There is no dissonance in these
declarations. There is a universal language pervading them all, having one

entanglement with religion." 403 U.S., at 612-613 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Precedent from our sister state of Arizona has upheld the proposition that the
express terms of a state's Enabling Act override any subsequent conflict with the
adoption the text of the State's Constitution. See cases cited in Princes Plaza Partners v.
State of Arizona, 187 Ariz. 214, 215-220; 928 P.2d 638, 643-644 (Ariz. App. 1995),
petition for review dismissed 187 Ariz. 501; 930 P.2d 1304 (Ariz. 1997).
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meaning; they affirm and reaffirm that this is a religious nation. These are
not individual sayings, declarations of private persons: they are organic
utterances; they speak the voice of the entire people."22
Imposing the obligation to uphold the Declaration of Independence on states when they
entered the Union was not new. In 1875, the United States Supreme Court stated:
The rights of life and personal liberty are natural rights of man. "To secure
these rights," says the Declaration of Independence, "governments are
instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed." The very highest duty of the States, when they entered into the
Union under the Constitution, was to protect all persons within their
boundaries in the enjoyment of these "unalienable rights with which they
were endowed by their Creator." Sovereignty, for this purpose, rests alone
with the States.
Similarly, as the Congress would bind the principles of the Declaration of
Independence to incoming states, the United Supreme Court would bind
them to itself. In 1897, the Court stated:
The first official action of this nation declared the foundation of
government in these words: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that
all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit
of happiness." While such declaration of principles may not have the force
of organic law, or be made the basis of judicial decision as to the limits of
right and duty, and while in all cases reference must be had to the organic
law of the nation for such limits, yet the latter is but the body and the letter
of which the former is the thought and the spirit, and it is always safe to
read the letter of the Constitution in the spirit of the Declaration of
Independence. No duty rests more imperatively upon the courts than the
enforcement of those constitutional provisions intended to secure that
equality of rights which is the foundation of free government.24

Church of The Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 467, 470 (1892).
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875).
Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 159-160 (1897).
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If anything, the Declaration of Independence is a document of action and conduct rather
than only faith in God, Higher Law, and their ability to discern and act on the same. As
the Declaration was premised on a personal relationship with God, relying on the
Declaration does not negate protection for religious conduct.
c.

The Lemon Test Need Not Be Applied to A Facial Establishment Clause
Challenge
The 2006 case of Cutter v. Wilkinson25 upheld the facial validity of the federal

imposition of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA") as
against a challenge based brought by the State of Ohio on the Establishment Clause
grounds. The Sixth Circuit split opinion - one of which reflected Justice Steven's
position under the Lemon test26 - was reversed. Notably, after referring specifically to
the three part Lemon test, the Court tersely stated "[w]e resolve this case on other
grounds."27
d.

Reliance on Lemon v. Kurtzman is Misplaced

The Utah Supreme Court has already rejected the Lemon test as the
foundation of the interpretation of the establishment clause provisions of the Utah
Constitution. The test should not be substituted as the parameters of free exercise

25

Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 717-718 ( 2005).
Id at 717-718. ("On interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. Citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 29 L. Ed. 2d 745, 91 S. Ct. 2105 (1971), the Court of Appeals held that § 3 of
RLUIPA "impermissibly advances religion by giving greater protection to religious rights
than to other constitutionally protected rights." 349 F.3d at 264. Affording "religious
prisoners rights superior to those of nonreligious prisoners," the court suggested, might
"encourage prisoners to become religious in order to enjoy greater rights." Id. at 266." )
26
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provisions either. Nonetheless, even were they to do so, the 1987 application of
the Lemon test in the case of Corporation of Presiding Bishop of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, indicates that accommodation of the
religious belief and practices of the Mission and Pastor Wilson at a level greater
than that required by the First Amendment free exercise clause would not violate
the first and second test prong of the Lemon test.
Under the Lemon analysis, it is a permissible legislative purpose to
alleviate significant governmental interference with the ability of religious
organizations to define and carry out their religious missions. Appellees
argue that there is no such purpose here because § 702 provided adequate
protection for religious employers prior to the 1972 amendment, when it
exempted only the religious activities of such employers from the statutory
ban on religious discrimination. We may assume for the sake of argument
that the pre-1972 exemption was adequate in the sense that the Free
Exercise Clause required no more. Nonetheless, it is a significant burden on
a religious organization to require it, on pain of substantial liability, to
predict which of its activities a secular court will consider religious. The
line is hardly a bright one, and an organization might understandably be
concerned that a judge would not understand its religious tenets and sense
of mission. Fear of potential liability might affect the way an organization
carried out what it understood to be its religious mission.
The second requirement under Lemon is that the law in question
have "a principal or primary effect. . . that neither advances nor inhibits
religion." 403 U.S., at 612. Undoubtedly, religious organizations are better
able now to advance their purposes than they were prior to the 1972
amendment to § 702. But religious groups have been better able to advance
their purposes on account of many laws that have passed constitutional
muster: for example, the property tax exemption at issue in Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, supra, or the loans of schoolbooks to schoolchildren, including
parochial school students, upheld in Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S.
236 (1968). A law is not unconstitutional simply because it allows
churches to advance religion, which is their very purpose. For a law to have
forbidden "effects" under Lemon, it must be fair to say that the government

Id. at 717 n. 6.
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itself has advanced religion through its own activities and influence. As the
Court observed in Walz, "for the men who wrote the Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment the 'establishment1 of a religion connoted sponsorship,
financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious
activity." 397 U.S., at 668. Accord, Lemon, 403 U.S., at 612.28
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court need not accept the argument of
Defendants-Appellants that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment precludes
the Utah Constitution from offering more protection for free exercise of religion than is
afforded by the current interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.
III. "RIPENESS" OF DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE CLAIMS
UNDER UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
The United States Supreme Court has established a low threshold for standing
necessary to challenge exclusionary zoning practices experienced by the Mission.
We hold only that plaintiff who seeks to challenge exclusionary zoning
practices must allege specific, concrete facts demonstrating that the
challenged practices harm him, and that he personally would benefit in a
tangible way from the court's intervention.2
The prior criminal prosecution of Pastor Wilson and self-censorship of both the Mission
and Pastor Wilson establish the "ripeness" and "standing" of federal claims for equitable
relief if they are not mooted by the ruling attendant the Utah Constitution.
Our analysis must begin with the recognition that, where threatened action
by government is concerned, we do not require a plaintiff to expose himself
to liability before bringing suit to challenge [***20] the basis for the threat
— for example, the constitutionality of a law threatened to be enforced. The
plaintiffs own action (or inaction) in failing to violate the law eliminates
the imminent threat of prosecution, but nonetheless does not eliminate
Article III jurisdiction. ... In each of these cases, the plaintiff had

28
29

483 U.S. 327, 335-336 ( 1987),
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490. 508 (1975) (footnote omitted)
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eliminated the imminent threat of harm by simply not doing what he
claimed the right to do (enter into a lease, or distribute handbills at the
shopping center). That did not preclude subject-matter jurisdiction because
the threat-eliminating behavior was effectively coerced. ... The dilemma
posed by that coercion ~ putting the challenger to the choice between
abandoning his rights or risking prosecution — is "a dilemma that it was the
very purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act to ameliorate." Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152, 87 S. Ct. 1507, 18 L. Ed. 2d
681 (1967).30
Because there is "immediate injury," a relaxed form of "ripeness" applies when First
Amendment freedoms are involved.
[I]n the First Amendment context, the ripeness doctrine is somewhat
relaxed. See Nutritional Health Alliance v. Shalala, 144 F.3d 220, 226 (2d
Cir.), cert denied, 525 U.S. 1040, 142 L. Ed. 2d 532, 119 S. Ct. 589 (1998);
New Mexicans for Bill Richardson v. Gonzales, 64 F.3d 1495, 1499 (10th
Cir. 1995); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1523 n. 12 (11th Cir. 1995);
ACORN v. City of Tulsa, 835 F.2d 735, 739-40 (10th Cir. 1987); Sanger v.
Reno, 966 F. Supp. 151, 161 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). Indeed, one of the leading
authorities on this subject states, "First Amendment rights of free
expression and association are particularly apt to be found ripe for
immediate protection, because of the fear of irretrievable loss." 13A
Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §
3532.3 (1984). ... Under the circumstances here, we hold that the alleged
retaliatory revocation of Dougherty's permit gave rise to a claim ripe for
adjudication.31
IV.

DAMAGES AVAILABLE UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
On appeal, the Defendants-Appellees recognize that the Plaintiffs have requested

monetary damages for violations of the federal constitution. (Opposition Brief at 16.)

30

Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 773 (U.S. 2007)
Doughtery v. Town of North Hempstead Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 282 F.3d 83,
nd
90 (2 Cir. 2002) cited and applied in Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Comm'n, 402
F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2005).
"3 1
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A.

The City Waived Objection for Nominal and General Damages

The trial reply brief indicated that for purposes of summary judgment no issue was
raised as to "nominal/' "general" or "presumed" damages. (Record at 4025.) The City
affirmed that it was seeking only "a ruling at this time that [at trial] plaintiffs have no
special, economic damages." (Record at 4026.)
Like Pastor Wilson, the Mission is entitled to sue on its own behalf for injuries it
has suffered.32
If, as broadly alleged, petitioners' steering practices have perceptibly
impaired[ Plaintiffs] ability to provide counseling and referral services for
low- and moderate-income home-seekers, there can be no question that the
organization has suffered injury in fact. Such concrete and demonstrable
injury to the organization's activities — with the consequent drain on the
organization's resources — constitutes far more than simply a setback to the
organization's abstract social interests, see Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.,
at 739. ...
n20 That the alleged injury results from the organization's noneconomic interest in encouraging open housing does not affect the
nature of the injury suffered, Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263 (1977), and accordingly
does not deprive the organization of standing.
B.

City Can Not Seek Ruling as to Special Damages At This Juncture

The Defendants-Appellees can not seek a determination that the Mission and
Pastor Wilson are not entitled to claim special damages for five reasons. First, as stated in
the lower court, the ruling on special damages was only requested in the event the case
went to trial. (Record at 1759-1761.) It did not go to trial because Judge Fratto granted

51
33

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975).
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982).
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the City's motion for summary judgment. Because it did not go to trial, the condition
precedent was not satisfied and the issue was not before the trial court for a ruling.34
Second, disputed facts regarding special damages were called to the trial court's
attention.(Record at 3219-3221.) The City had filed with their motion a copy of the
same. (Record at 2118.) Third, after the appeal was filed, the Defendants-Appelles' did
not file a cross-appeal. To reach the issue of special damages applicable at the time of
trial, the judgment granted by Judge Fratto would have to be reversed.35 Having failed to
seek a reversal of Judge Fratto's judgment, the City may not now seek reversal. Fourth,
seeking reversal would moot the City's opposition on appeal, on the merits. Fifth, as a
reversal and remand would justify seeking an amendment of pleading to include other
individuals and damages occurred since October 2002, limiting special damages now is
not appropriate.
V.
FACT OF LACK OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND ARGUMENT
REGARDING VAGUENESS CLAIMS NOT WAIVED
Defendants-Appellants claim the Plaintiffs-Appellants waived specific issues.
While the brief suggests it will argue a Due Process violation as part
of Issue #3, it never makes such an argument. Nothing in either the
Issues or the argument address vagueness.
(Opposition Brief at 24.) The City's argument of waiver is wrong.

Culbertson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2001 UT 108, P55, 44 P.3d 642
State v. South, 924 P.2d 354, 357 (Utah 1996).
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A.

Failure to Afford Procedural Due Process Was A Factual Occurrence
Relied On to Demonstrate Violation of Mission's Prima Facie case
of Denial of Free Exercise Freedoms

Table 2 and Table 3 of the Opening Brief summarized violations of selfimposed mandatory law and its direct impact on the Mission's inability to relocate.
(Opening Brief at 26-29.) The City also used the procedurally deficient ruling of
the Board of Adjustments to which the Mission was not a party to refuse to
consider allowing the Mission to re-apply in 2004 regarding the Rosewood
Terrace property. (Opening Brief at 29.) The Mission presented to the trial court
and on appeal that the City has imposed on the Mission significant burdens
associated with relocation in the City. These burdens were neither imposed on the
Interfaith Churches nor used to limit their future growth and development of other
entities or persons in the City from 1997 through the present. (Opening Brief at
25-38.) Examples of denial of procedural due process were specifically relied
upon to show that the "the administrative officer or body, act[ed] without the
scope of his or its defined statutory authority."36 In addition, the conduct denying
procedural due process was referred to as examples that "could not satisfy
[Defendants-Apellees'] burden of proof of showing a compelling interest and the
use of least restrictive means" under the Utah Constitution's free exercise religious
provisions. (Opening Brief at 46.)
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B.

Vagueness and Denial of Due Process Based on Standardless Mandates
Were Adequately Raised as a Matter of Fact and Law

Vagueness and denial of due process based on standardless mandates were
specifically included as part of the analysis dealing with prior restraint of free exercise of
religion. Analysis dealing with the "unbridled discretion" in facial prior restraint analysis
was explained as showing the equivalent of vagueness or denial of due process.
"Vagueness" and "unbridled discretion" under a prior restraint challenge
are interchangeable, [fn 58] The following three "vagueness" or
"standardless" application of the City ordinances to the Mission
demonstrate the validity of the "as applied" prior restraint challenge, [fn 59]
[Fn. 58] See ACORN v. City of Tulsa, 835 F.2d 735, 741 n.l (10th
Cir. 1987).
[Fn.59] The "standardless" challenge recited herein also
demonstrates a successful pleading and proffer of a prima facie case
of a facial and as applied vagueness under the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
(Opening Brief at 52) The three examples given showed current, on-going conflicting
interpretations of the City Code that had been applied.
Conflicting interpretations among those charged with enforcing zoning
laws that impact First Amendment freedom of religion is sufficient to
establish a violation of related constitutional doctrines of vagueness and
unbridled discretion that are evident in a successful facial challenge to prior
restraints, [fn 61]
[fn. 61] The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has found that when
"unbridled discretion" is shown as a matter of prior restraint

'° Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Taylor 15 Utah 2d 234, 238, 390 P.2d 592,
595(1964)
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analysis, then facial unconstitutionality on grounds of vagueness as
it relates to arbitrary enforcement has been established. See ACORN
v. Tulsa, supra.
(Opening Brief at 55.) Specific, recent federal circuit authority analyzing conflicting
interpretations of City Code creating an actionable the "risk" of arbitrary enforcement
was cited and reviewed. This federal authority was applied to the facts of this case.
(Opening Brief at 55.)

Applying Rule 24(a)(9) Utah R. Civ.P, no argument or facts

were waived on appeal regarding the "fact" of denial of procedural due process or the as
applied "vagueness" claims.
VI.

FIRST ASSEMBLY OF GOD IS DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THIS CASE
From facts reviewed previously, the Defendants-Appellants reliance on the federal

Eleventh Circuit opinion in First Assembly of God of Naples, v. Collier County,37 is
unfounded and non-persuasive in this case for five reasons. First, the Mission
consistently stated that evidence of religious hostility included conduct that was not in
conformance with City ordinances and was void ab initio.

Second, as applied, the

"general" laws were not uniform regarding "places of worship" and serving the homeless.
Third, there was much more than "slight suspicion" that the moratorium and unlawful
issuance or hearing on "use" interpretation letters occurred because of hostility to
religious beliefs and practices.

Fourth, because as applied, Interfaith affiliated churches

were exempt from application, appearance at community council meetings, and

37
38

20F.3d419(ll t h Cir. 1994)
This would have changed the result in the case. See id. at 421 n. 1.
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inspection, Interfaith affiliated churches, a compelling interest must be shown to deny an
exemption to the hardships caused by the treatment of the Mission and Pastor Wilson.40
Fifth, the as applied "vagueness" enforcement claims as recognized by the federal
Eleventh Circuit was decided in 2005, the actual (rather than risk of) treatment by the
City trumps the 1994 opinion. The City's arguments to the contrary are factually and
legally unsound.
CONCLUSION
This Court can remedy the situation by recognizing the validity of the equitable and
legal claims under the Utah and United States Constitutions. The City's Motion for
Summary Judgment should be reversed.
DATED this 19th day of October 2007.

Matthew Hilton
Jacqueline F. de Gaston
Attorneys for the Mission and
Pastor Wilson

Jy

See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Ave v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
547(emphasis added.)
40
See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990) ("As the plurality
pointed out in Roy, our decisions in the unemployment cases stand for the proposition
that where the State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to
extend that system to cases of "religious hardship" without compelling reason. Bowen v.
Roy, supra, at 708.")
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